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TheCommission'sproposal  forunification  of thebananamarket
would  impose  big  costs on  EC consumers  and banana  producers
in a number  of developing  countries.  Alternative  options exist
that  would  allow  the  Community  and  suppliers  in all developing
countries  to benefit  from unification.  Vested  interests  in market-
ing arm  blocking  consideration  of sensible  policies.
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This  paper-a  product  of the  International  Trade  Division,  International  Economics  Department-  is part  of a larger
effort  in  the department  to  understand  the implications  for  developing  countries  of changes  in  the industrial  countries'
tradepolicies.  Copies  ofthepaperareavailable  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.
Please contact  Audrey  Kitson-Walters,  room S7-053,  extension  33712  (August 1992,  22 pages).
Some EC countries  give  preferred  market  access  and  Several  plausible  versions  of the Commission's
high  prices to bananas from  selected developing  proposal  are modelled.  At best they are found  to be
countries  or EC regional  suppliers.  This  preferential  slightly  less  costly than  existing  policies  and at worst,
status is regarded  as a form of aid to these  countries,  considerably  more costly.  A 3.5 percent  reduction  in
most of which  are developing  small island  economies.  the quota allocation  is estimated  to lead to a 30
EC marketers  of bananas  from these preferred  percent increase  in the cost of the proposal.
suppliers  also  benefit  because  of the high  retail  prices.
Nonpreferred  suppliers  - mainly  developing  Borrell  and Yang  conclude  that the
countries  of Latin America  - are hurt by the policies  Commission's  proposal  for a unified  EC banana
because  access  is denied or restricted  and the lower  policy  appears  to be little more than  a way of replac-
demand  depresses  the world  price for bananas.  ing existing  distortionary  national  policies with  an
almost  equally  distortionary  single policy  and market.
The Community's  commitment  to  establish  a  The only  difference:  the costs would  be borne  by
single unified  EC banana market  on December  31,  consumers  in all EC countries  rather than consumers
1992  provides  a timely  opportunity  to reform  existing  in only  some countries.  Worse  still, costs  could
distortionary  trade  policies.  The recently  announced  increase.  Markets  that  now gain the benefits  of mostly
proposal  of the Commission  of European  Communi-  open and competitive  marketing  such as Germany
ties to regulate  banana  trade within  a unified  market  would  face closed  and uncompetitive  conditions.
relies on quotas  to control  imports.  The proposal  is
extremely  complicated.  It is designed  to severely  For developing  countries  exporting  bananas,  the
restrict  competition  and to maintain  the advantages  of  proposal  offers  little.  At best  conditions  may be no
selected  groups.  worse  than they are now. At worst the policy  could
hurt  Latin American  suppliers  even more  than current
Borrell  and Yang  update  their earlier  analysis  of  policies  and introduce  considerable  confusion  about
world  banana  trade  to reflect  the market  in 1993.  the level of support  to preferred  suppliers.  Under  the
They  evaluate  the implications  of the Commission's  Commhssion's  proposed  quota system  aid will not be
proposal  alongside  existing  and alternative  policies.  well targeted A more  efficient  way of achieving  the
They fnd that  cunrent  policies  cost  EC consumers  EC's aid commitment  is through  a small  tariff of
about $1.6 billion  annually  to transfer  a net benefit  of  about 17  percent,  used to fund a system  of well-
$0.3 billion  a year to preferred  suppliers.  So, it costs  targeted  deficiency  payments  or direct  aid.
EC consumers  about $5.30  to transfer  $1.00  of aid to
select  developing  countries  or regions.  Additionally,  The only  reason  for choosing  the Commission's
every doUar  of aid reaching  preferred  suppliers  costs  proposal  over simpler,  tariff-based  options  seems  to
other  developing  country  suppliers  $0.32.  EC  ke to maintain  the vested  interests  of protected  EC
marketers  are the main  beneficiaries.  Of the $5.30  marketers.  But this  is contrary  to the objectives  of
cost to EC consumers,  over  $3.00 is collected  as  unification,  which  are to seek  gains from increased
excessive  marketing  margins  by protected  importers  competition  and trade.
and wholesalers.  About  $1.00 is lost  in outright  waste.
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1. BANANAS:  THE  ONLY  PRODUCT  STILL  WITHOUT  AN
APPROVED  PLAN  FOR  EC  MARKET  UNIFICATION
A unified internal European Community (EC) market holds the promise of big gains in
economic  efficiency arising from increased competition,  economies  of scale and scope, and
rationalisation of production and trade. The proposal advanced by the Commission of
European  Communities' interdepartmental  working party for an internal market on bananas
(12 May 1992)  holds no such promise.  Indeed,  the opposite  appears  to be the case.
Existing national banana policies have been shown  to impose hefty costs on the Community
and on many banana suppliers  - see Borrell and Yang (1990) and Borre!l and Cuthbertson
(1991). The proposals of the interdepartmental  working committee for arrangements after
December 1992 could impose even greater costs. Yet there are other policy options which
could provide large gains in efficiency.  Vested interests within the Community  appear to be
blocking  the consideration  let alone adoption  of sensible  policies.
Existing national policies give preferred  market access to some developing countries  or EC
regional  suppliers  - preferred  suppliers.  These arrangements  are regarded  as providing  aid to
the preferred supplying countries or regions - most of which are small island economies.
Quota schemes operating in the United Kingdom,  France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece
limit imports of bananas into the EC from non-preferred  suppliers and cause prices to be
different in each country but higher than the world price - see Borrell and Cuthbertson
(1991).  Non-preferred  suppliers  are also developing  countries  and the quota restrictions  hurt
them because access is denied or restricted  and the lower demand depresses  the world price
for bananas  in other markets.
Although the qaota restrictions  confer some advantage  to preferred suppliers through  higher
than normal market prices (as intended), the main advantage is captured by importers,
wholesalers and retailers in countries with quotas (which is presumably unintended). The
quotas restrict competition in the marketing of bananas, allowing monopoly profits to be
earned at the expense  of EC consumers.
Denmark,  the Netherlands,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and Ireland impose a 20 percent customs
duty on banana  imports  from non-preferred  suppliers.  This also limits imports  to some  degree
but not as severely as quotas do in other EC countries. Germany imposes virtually no
restrictions  on imports.
In establishing a single EC market on 31 December 1992, separate national policies will be
replaced  by a unified  policy which  will allow free intracommunity  trade. Bananas  are the only
product on which the EC has not yet decided how to proceed. Making a decision is proving
difficult  because the EC faces competing  obligations.2
Policy relating to the unified market must be consistent with all aspects of  the Single
European Act 1986; commitments to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
(signatories  to the Lome IV Convention)  which  include giving special access to bananas  must
be honored and the interests of banana producers in overseas EC territories (Guadeloupe,
Martinique,  the Canary Islands and Madeira) must be similarly considered; policy changes
must be compatible  with the General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);  and the EC is
committed  to liberalising  imports  of tropical  products  (which  include bananas)  in the Uruguay
round of GATT  negotiations.  The welfare  of EC consumers  is also an obvious  consideration.
Previous work (Borrell and Cuthbertson  1991) has shown that options exist under which the
European Community  could be made better off while the interests of supplying  countries  -
preferred and non-preferred  - could be safeguarded and improved. Essentially these are
tariff-based  options.  Quota-based  options were shown to be the least efficient.  These options
hurt EC consumers and suppliers  in non-preferred  developing  countries. They suit protected
EC marketers of bananas and shift the important  responsibility  and workings  of the market
away from competitive  agents  to officials  within the European  Community  bureaucracy.
The Commission's current proposal is a quota-based  option and is extremely complicated.
Indeed, the proposal appears  to be deliberately  and unnecessarily  complicated  to mask  its true
effects. It is designed to greatly restrict competition  within the marketing  chain and to confer
on  and  maintain  advantages  to  selected groups  within the  market. Its  complicated
arrangements  would require a big bureaucracy  to monitor,  administer and control. It would
give EC officials a great deal of power and control over the market. Many groups, but
particularly those likely to be disadvantaged  by such arrangements,  are eager to understand
what the effects  could be.
The main objective  of this paper is to make transparent  the effects  from implementation  of the
proposal. The costs of existing policies  as previously estimated  by Borrell and Yang (1990)
and Borrell and Cuthbertson  (1991) for 1987 are updated to account  for the changes which
have occurred  since  then. The benefits  of alternative  policies  are also highlighted.
Note: Since this study was completed,  the Commission  has made available  some details  of its
final proposal. It appears to be a blend of the two variants of its proposal released in May.
Essentially,  the major elements of the earlier proposal  analyzed in this paper remain the same
- a base quota of 1.4 million tons and a supplementary  quota to non-preferred  suppliers,
together  with a complicated  system  of licenses  and guarantees.3
2.  HOW  THE EC PROPOSAL  WOULD  WORK
The EC Commission  has proposed  two variants  of one quota-based  option.  Both would  allow
EC officials to manage  trade and control  competition.  Quantitative  controls  and a 20 percent
rate of customs  duty on the entry of bananas  from non-preferred  suppliers  - so-called  dollar
bananas (see box 2.1)  - would cause prices to EC consumers  to be bid up above what they
would be in a comnpetitive  market.  Through the use of various complicated  licensing  systems
(not yet specified), people importing and marketing dollar bananas would  'be required to
transfer revenue they earn from selling  on the high-priced  EC market to those supplying  the
market with non-dollar bananas. No formal quantitative restrictions would apply to the
imports of non-dollar bananas but they would be monitored  with a view to implementing
controls if there were large increases  in imports  from preferred  suppliers.
All bananas of equa; quality would sell for virtually the same price across the European
Community,  irrespective  of their origin  - the only differences  would reflect transport  costs.
But the effe-tive price received  by producers  and traditional  marketers  of non-dollar  bananas
would  be greater  than the market  price.
Provided producers and marketers of non-dollar bananas delivered their fruit to the EC
market, they would  receive supplementary  revenues collected  by the marketers  of dollar fruit
which would be transferred indirectly to them through the proposed licensing system. In
effect, they would receive a kind of deficiency payment giving them higher-than-market
prices and equal to the prices they receive  now.
Box 2.1: Preferred  and non-preferred  suppliers  of EC banana imports
Preferred suppliers  Country giving special preference  Non-preferred suppliers
Latin America  or so-called 'dollar'
Afican,  Caribbean  and  area countries  of Central  and South
Paciflc  (ACP) counries  America
Belize  United  Kingdom  Colombia
Jamaica  United  Kingdom  Costa  Rica
Surinam  Unitcd  Kingdom  Guatemala
Windward  Islands  United  Kingdom  Honduras
Somalia  Italy  Panama
Cameroon  France  Ecuador
CBte  d'Ivoire  France  Brazil




Canary  Islands  Spain
a Under  the  Lom6  Convention  a1I  ACP  countries  have  duty  free  access  to proted  EC  madfets.  Germany  is vinually  a free  madcet,  so
gives  no preference  to ACP  suppliers.4
Presently  the prices received  by preferred  producers and marketers  vary widely  depending  on
the country to which they supply. Complicated  controls  over the licensing system would be
designed to try to ensure existing differences were maintained so that the current quantities
marketed and the  revenues received by preferred producers and marketers would be
maintained.
The mechanics  of the proposal  are set out in box 2.2. What is apparent from box 2.2 is how
difficult it will be to set the quota to balance  the revenues earned on dollar bananas and the
supplementary  payments  made on non-dollar  bananas.  With constant changes  in deniand and
supply it will be impossible to determine the quota level to most efficiently achieve the
Commission's price targets. Inevitable differences  in quality between dollar and non-dollar
bananas  will add to this difficulty.  In practice,  the quota will not be set obje,ctively  but, rather,
will be a matter of judgment.  And  because the livelihoods  of most operators  in the market will
become closely linked to the level at which the quota is set, they wiii try to influenme  the
judgment.
The variants of the Commission's proposal differ in the manner in which the quantitative
controls would be set. In the first variant a quota would be set explicitly and performance
measures set up to monitor whether quantities of non-dollar banana imports and preferred
suppliers' incomes were being  maintained.  Adjustments  to the quota would  be made to try to
hit various  performance  targets.
Under the second variant, instead of an explicit quota, quantitative controls would be
implicitly  set through  the use of a so-called  partnership ratio. Dollar fruit could be imported
in fixed ratio to non-dollar  fruit. Forward  estimates  of consumption  and production would be
made and a ratio established to try to achieve various performance  targets. Changes to the
ratio could be made throughout the year as information  about consumption  and production
came to hand.
It is difficult to see major differences  between the two variants.  The broad economic  effects
of both are the same  - they are those  depicted  in box 2.2.
A major uncertainty  of the proposal  is how  well the arrangements  will work to transfer  excess
revenue from marketers  of dollar bananas  to marketers  and producers  of non-dollar  bananas.
Because of the licensing arrangements  proposed and the quota restrictions the EC banana
market will be far from a competitive  market.  Incentives  may be created  for marketers  of non-
dollar and dollar fruit to exploit their market powers.
The Commission does not appear to have worked through the practicalities of how the
licensing arrangement  would work (Commission  Working Party 1992).  It has stated that the
allocation of dollar import  quantities  by issue of import certificates  among  various operators
(marketers) would be used as a mechanism to favor existing preferred suppliers  - but the
mechanism  (or mechanisms)  has not been  revealed.5
Box 2.2: The mechanics  of the Commission's  proposal
The  Commission's  proposal  is illustrated  graphically  below.  'Dollar' bananas  (the term  given  to bananas
from  non-preferred  suppliers)  will be subject  to a guaranteed  minimum  quota  of 1.4 million  tons and an
autonomou.  quota  which  will  be varied  with  a view  to managing  the  EC internal  price.  The  minimum  quota
would  be increased  by a minimum  of 3 percent  annually.  Non-dollar  bananas  will not be subject  to any
restrictions.  The  controlled  quota  supply  plus the uncontrolled  non-dollar  supply  will determine  the total
supply  Q.
The  total  supply  of Q bananas  will  cause  the  internal  EC consumer  price  for  bananas  to settle  at the  EC  price
and above  the world  price.  The  EC price  will  exceed  the world  price  by at least  the  20 percent  of customs
duty  to be levied  on the  cif  value  of dollar  bananas.  The  tariff  revenue  raised  from  the  duty  will  be retained  by
the  Commission  - a proposal  which  should  raise  serious  questions  on both  a national  and  international  level.
At the EC price, consumption  will be reduced  from Qft to Q, generating  a net economic  loss for the
Community  of the  amount  LOSS.
The  excess  of the  EC price  over  and above  the  world  price  plve  the  tariff  will  determine  the  RENT  earned
initially  by marketers  of dollar  fruit  and subsequently  transferred  as the  SUBSIDY  SUPPLEMENT  to prop  up
preferred  producer  and  marketer  prices.  At  this  price,  non-deollar  suppliers  will  be induced  to supply  QPref.  -
an amount  similar  to that  supplied  now.  Theoretically,  the  RENT  earned  would  exactly  match  the  SUBSIDY
SUPPLEMENT.  In practice,  setting  a quota  so that these  two amounts  are exactly  equal would  be nigh
impossible.  Set  too high  the  quota  would  not create  prices  high  enough  to generate  the  excess  revenue  to pay
sufficiently  high  supplements.  Set  too  low  it would  create  prices  and  supplements  higher  than  intended.  These
might  induce  increases  in non-dollar  supplies  above  those  intended.
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Demand  and supply  are continuously  changing  and,  given  the  likely  inelastic  nature  of demand,  even  small
changes  in market  conditions  could  greatly  disrupt  the  balance  between  rents  and  supplements.  Setting  of the
annual  quota  would  become  extremely  important  to many  groups  in the market.  Their  livelihoods  would
depend  on it. Setting  of the  quota  would  become  vulnerable  to political  interference.
If there  were  quality  differences  between  dollar  and non-dollar  fruit,  higher  rents  and  supplements  would  be
required  to maintain  existing  preferred  suppliers'  prices.  The  quality  of at least  some  preferred  suppliers  is
inferior  to that  of dollar  fruLt.  The  market  price  received  by these  preferred  suppliers  would  be below  the
indicated  EC price  and so larger  supplements  would  be required  to maintain  their  prices.  To force  the non-
preferred  marketers  to raise  sufficient  rent  to pay  the  extra  supplement  the  quota  would  need  to be constrained
below  the  level  indicated  in the  graph  to lift taie  EC price  further  above  the  world  price  plus  the  tariff.6
Politically,  setting the quota and licenses will gain a lot of attention.  With no objective  basis
for deciding either quotas or supplementary  transfers, these decisions  will become an event
which will generate much socially unproductive  effort in both the EC and in the producing
countries.
EC marketers  of non-dollar  bananas have long operated under uncompetitive  conditions due
to the quotas applying  in their countries.  The marketing  and supply  of non-dollar bananas is
dominated by a few trading/marketing  entities. If these marketers jointly or separately are
able to restrict the supply of non-dollar  bananas they will force the EC internal price to rise
above that intended by the Commission.  Because  of the quota limit on dollar fruit, restricting
non-dollar fruit would reduce supply below that intended by the Commission  in setting the
quota. With the supply of non-dollar bananas restricted, marketers of dollar fruit would be
forced to bid up the subsidy supplements  they paid to marketers of non-dollar fruit for the
right to market dollar fruit. In this way the higher EC prices would be transferred to the
marketers  of non-dollar  fruit.
Although  marketing  of dollar fruit is largely unrestricted  and open to competition  in Germany
and those countries imposing a 20 percent tariff only, it is concentrated on a handful of
marketing  companies.  It may be that with the imports  of bananas  limited (under the proposal)
it would  pay marketers of dollar fruit to further restrict the supply of bananas below that
intended by the Commission  knowing that once the quota was full no additional imports
could compete. Importers may be able to do this by importing fruit to fill the quota but
subsequently destroying that fruit to force up the price on the EC market. If non-dollar
bananas were inferior to dollar bananas, it may pay marketers of dollar bananas to buy up
imported non-dollar bananas and destroy them rather than dollar bananas. Because of the
concentration of control in the marketing and supply of non-dollar bananas, any excess
revenues earned by marketers of dollar bananas may end up being shared in part with
marketers  of non-dollar  fruit.
In an open market it is unlikely that concentration  of control would be a problem because  of
the threat of competition. In the most open market within the European Community now,
Germany,  marketing  margins are the lowest of any EC country and are competitive  with US
margins  after accounting  for exchange  rate differences  - see  box 3.1.
True, there can be no concrete proof that marketers of bananas would exploit their market
powers created by quotas and licences. Nonetheless,  incentives  will be created to encourage
and partly condone such behaviour  by the Commission's  proposal.  And once introduced,  such
arrangements  would  be difficult to remove.  This difficulty  is well illustrated  by the problems
of removing  the protection  now provided  by existing national  banana  quota schemes.7
3. MEASURING  THE  ECONOMiC  AND  WELFARE  EFFECTS
OF THE EC PROPOSAL
How bad is the EC proposal  relative  to existing policies  they are designed  to replace  and
relative to alternative policies which could be introduced? Borrell and Yang and Borrell and
Cuthbertson have shown that existing national policies are highly inet.icient relative to a free
trade situation. Existing policies provide a measuring stick by which to judge the efficiency of
other policies such as the Commission's proposal.
The previous  analysis was based on data for 1987 and hence reflecte;l the structure of the
market  at that time. Since  1987 the market  has glown markedly.  In  1987 total EC banana
imports  equalled  2.5 million  tons.  On recent  trends,  EC  banana  imports could  reach  3.6
million tons for 1993. To provide a current basis of measurement, we up-dated the data and
model of the two previous studies to reflect the structure of the market in 1993. The price data
in the model are those for 1990 while the trade data are World Bank projections for 1993 -
see Appendix A. The current version of the model also includes different assumptions about
retail margins in Europe from those made in previous studies - see box 3. 1.
Box 3.1: This model compared with earlier versions: retail margins
A major difference between the model run in this study and that in the study of Borrell and
Cuthbertson  is in the treatment of retail margins in Europe.  The study of Borrell  and Cuthbertson
sought to refine the treatment  of retail margins  over that provided  by Borrell and Yang.  This study
makes a  further refinement in the form of a more exact treatment of the influence of the
dollarlDeutschemark  exchange rate on the EC free market retail price. The German retail price is
used as an indicator of the retail margin that would prevail if free trade replaced existing
arrangements.  The  German  margin  is appropriate  because  a virtual free  market exists in Germany.
Given the sustained  strength  of the Deutschemaik  over the dollar since 1987,  the free maiket retail
margin  used by Borrell  and Cuthbertson,  which was the average  margin  in Germany  over the period
1978-90 measured  in US dollars,  now appears to be too low. Although the margin did not change
much measured in Deutschemarks,  because of the strength of the Deutschemark,  German retail
margins measured  in US dollars increased appreciably  after 1986 well above those in the United
States. Previously they had been similar and the averaged data over the period 1978-90 used
previously reflected this. In the current version of the model the free market retail margin is
assumed  to be that which  applied in Germany  in 1990.8
The point  of reference:  inefficiencies  of existing  policies
Up-dated  measures  of the economic  effects  of existing  policies  are reported in figures 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3. The effects of the EC country  policies  on the world market are similar in percentage
terms to those reported in the two earlier studies  - figure 3.1. However, the costs of the
policies  have increased  in line with the growth in the market  - figure 3.2. Whc.  e  previously
Borrell and Cuthbertson  esti0nated  that existing policies cost EC consumers around US$1.4
billion a year, the new estimate is $1.6 billion. The distribution  of these costs by country or
country  group is set out in figure 3.3. The policies  are costly for all countries  except Germany
because  of its virtual free market policy.
As an instrument for delivering aid to various preferred supplying countries and regions
existing policies are highly inefficient - as reported in the earlier studies. In total, an
estimated  $302 million is received as a form of aid income by preferred  suppliers due to the
higher prices they receive. But it costs EC consumers  an esdmated $5.3') to transfer each
dollar of that aid to preferred  supplier  countries  and  regions.
Of each $5.30 paid by 2onsumers,  over $3.00 goes to EC importers,  wholesalers  or retailers  as
monopoly profits, $0.37 is collected as tariff revenue by the Commission, one dollar is
transferred  to preferred  suppliers  and the rest  - nearly  a dollar - is wasted throu h outright
Figure 3.1: National policies  of EC countries influence world banana trade
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Figure  3.3:  Existing  policies  discourage  consumption  and impose  big costs  on consumers
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inefficiencies created by the arrangements. For instance, more resources are used up in
producing bananas than is necessary  because at least some of the bananas now produced at
high cost in preferred  supplying  countries  could be produced  with fewer or cheaper  resources
in the more efficient,  non-preferred  supplying  countries  of Latin America.
Overall, the net cost to the European  Community  is around $1.90 to transfer each dollar to
preferred suppliers. Additionally, because existing policies constrain EC import demand
generally,  they depress the world price of bananas. Tfhis  imposes an indirect annual cost on
non-preferred suppliers (mainly Latin American countries). And for every dollar of aid
received by preferred  suppliers  a cost of $0.32 is imposed  on banana producers  elsewhere.  In
total this is equivalent  to an estimated  $98  million  annually.
How  the  proposal  measures  up
To evaluate the effects of the Commission's  proposal  we model  the quota proposal assuming
a number  of different  objectives  which  the Commission  may seek to pursue were the proposal
to become  operative.  The versions  of the proposal  modelled  are set out in box 3.2.
Even the most liberal interpretation  of the  proposal is highly  restrictive  and costly
The estimated  annual  costs to the EC of seven  versions of the proposal relative  to the costs of
existing policies are given in figure 3.4. Version 1 which aims to protect the revenues and
sales volumes of preferred producers and marketers represents  probably the narrowest and
strictest interpretation of the Commission's somewhat vague proposal. Estimates of the
annual  cost of this version are for an increase  in annual tariff revenue from $112 million  now
to $271 million (a cost to EC consumers),  a decrease in excess profits earned in marketing
bananas  - from  $918  million  to  $517  million  - and  some  reduction  in  outright
inefficiencies - $576 million to  $466 million. Overall, version 1 represents a  small
improvement  over tuie  costs of existing  policies  - $1.6 billion down to $1.2 billion annually.
Nonetheless,  the policy under this version would  remain highly inefficient.  It would cost EC
consumers around $4.00 for every dollar of aid received by preferred suppliers. For every
dollar received by preferred  suppliers,  non-preferred  suppliers  would continue  to incur a cost
of about $0.30.
Under version 1 the EC consumer price would settle out at an estimated $1850 per ton,
slightly less than the current weighted average EC price of $1877 per ton. Among EC
countries, German, Dutch, Belgium, Danish, Irish and Luxembourg consumers would face
higher prices and their costs in terms  of reduced  consumption  and higher prices would  go up
an estimated  $492 million  a year compared  to now. Consumers  in all other countries  who now
pay prices above $1850  per ton would benefit from lower prices and increased  consumption.11
In effect the policy  under version  1 would shift the costs of existing polices away from the
high banana price countries to the low banana price countries - mainly Germany.
The EC proposal could be even more inefficient  than the policies  it aims to replace
The quota established  under version  1 --- 2260 thousand tons for  1993 - is probably the
highest quota the Conmmission  would conceivably allow. A higher quota would not meet the
Commission's  implied  intention  to  protect  the  sales  volume  and  revenue  of  preferred
producers and marketers. Moreover, another interpretation of the Commission proposal is that
it may  also  seek  to  provide  some  sort of  compensation  to  non-preferred  suppliers  and
marketers for placing restrictions on their access and for loss of the excess profit currently
Box 3.2: Versions of the proposal  modelled in this study
Version  1: The model is used to solve for a specific  quota level. The quota will push up the retail
price and marketing  margin above a competitive  level. The quota  determined  by the model will be
that required to increase retail prices enough, so marketers of dollar bananas can just afford to
cross-subsidise  the marketing  of non-dollar fruit to a point where total revenues  (sales price plus
subsidy  supplement)  eamed on non-dollar  fruit are the same as now.  This assumes  a highly  efficient
mechanism  for forcing  marketers  of dollar fruit  to transfer  the extra revenue  they will eam because
of high retail prices to marketers and producers of non-dollar fruit - although at this stage the
Commission  has not specified in any detail how this will work. The subsidy supplement  would
represent  the difference  between  the price marketers  of non-dollar  fruit receive  now and that which
would prevail across the EC under the quota proposal. It is also assumed that marketers of non-
dollar fruit would continue to pay producers of non-dollar bananas the prices they are currently
paid.
Version  2: As above except that the specific quota is determined  so as to ensure all marketers of
banarnas  - dollar  and non-dolar alike  - who now receive  retail  margins  above  competitive  levels
continue  to do so. Marketers  of dollar fruit in Italy, United  Kingdom  and France  now receive  retail
margin  above  purely  competitive  levels.
Version  3: Like variant I except that the quota would  be set to generate  enough  extra revenue  from
the sale of dollar fruit to maintain high prices to producers of non-dollar bananas only. The
monopoly  profits of non-dollar  and dollar marketers  would  not be preserved.
Version  4: The quota is not determined  by the model. Rather, the quota is fixed at progressively
lower levels than that determined by the model under variant 1. This is done to ensure the
Commission  overshoots  on its objective  of preserving  existing  benefits to producers  and marketers
of dollar bananas whose access has been restricted  by the quota. Essentially  this reflects the fact
that the Commission  will have a preference  to overshoot and provide more protection than now
rather than risk undershooting.12
Figure 3.4: Like existing policies  the EC proposal  looks costly
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earned by marketers of dollar bananas  in France, the United Kingdom and Italy. To do this
the quota would  be further  restricted  to drive up EC retail  prices and marketing  margins.  If the
Commission  sought to compensate  marketers of dollar bananas fully, while still aiming to
achieve its other objectives  in relation  to preferred  producers  and marketers  - version 2-  a
quota set at 2140 thousand tons for 1993 and giving a EC consumer  price of $1967  per ton
would,  on model estimates,  do this. As revealed in figure 3.4, the total costs to EC consumers
would rise compared to now - $1.7 billion per year compared to $1.6 billion now - due in
part to the increased  tariff revenue  collected  by the Commission.  The costs to German, Dutch,
Danish, Belgium,  and Irish consumers  would  increase  by $643 million  a year.13
Setiing the quota  efficiently  would  be extremely  difficult
The differences between version 1 and version 2 help highlight another feature of the
Commission's  proposal:  the economic  effects of the proposal  are highly sensitive  to the level
at which the quota is set. A 3.5 percent reduction  in the quota causes more than a 30 percent
increase  in the cost of the proposal.  Under version 4a, with a quota set at 2000 thousand  tons
- less than 12 percent  below version 1  - the cost of the proposal  blows out to an estimated
$2.2 billion annually or 72 percent higher than version 1. The costs to German, Dutch,
Danish, Belgium,  Luxembourg  and Irish consumers  would increase by $871 million a year.
Versions  4b and 4c show the effects  of further  restricting  the quota.
The high sensitivity  of the effects of the proposal are further highlighted in figure 3.5. The
figure reveals how small reductions in the quota cause large increases in the marketing
margin above the competitive level which would prevail in the absence of quotas. These
excess  marketing  margins  would be required to achieve  the Commission's  assumed  objectives
under  the versions  modelled.
Figure 3.5 also shows  how small changes in annual  production in non-preferred  suppliers-
plus or minus 10 percent (well within the realms of possibility)  - would  require changes  in
the qtuota  to achieve the objectives of the scheme. A 10 percent decline in non-preferred
suppliers' production in any one year would cause an increase  in the world price of bananas
Figure 3.5: Managing the quota  would be difficult
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and the EC import price. Consumption within the EC would decline to  some extent in
response  to the higher price. The quota would  have to be reduced accordingly  to maintain an
excess marketing margin  to cross-subsidise  the sale of non-dollar bananas  - 2260 thousand
tons down to 2162 thousand  tons for version 1. But because of a higher world and EC import
price, the excess margin  could decline somewhat  - $208 per ton down to $152 for version 1
- and the sales and revenue  of preferred  producers  and marketers  would  remain as now.
Without  such a decline in quota the sales and revenue targets  for the preferred  producers and
marketers would not be achieved. The Commission would come under pressure to make
adjustments.  Similarly,  changes in internal EC market conditions such as growth in demand
from year to year and changes  in demand  due to changes  in the price of other fruit will require
continual  changes in the quota to efficiently  achieve  the objectives  of the proposal.
Quality differences between dollar and non-dollar bananas would add to the difficulties in
setting  the quota. To the extent that the market  may have a preference  for dollar bananas,  non-
dollar bananas may trade at a discount to dollar bananas  under the Commission  propcsal. If
non-dollar bananas traded at a 10 percent discount to dollar bananas, under version 1 the
quota would need to be reduced from an estimated  2260 thousand  tons to 2173 thousand  tons
so that the excess marketing  margin would increase  from an estimated  $208 per ton to $292
per ton. Making such fine adjustments in setting the quota in the face of great uncertainty
about the quality differences  perceived  by consumers  would  be virtually impossible.
The Commission  wouldface pressures  to set the quota restrictively  rather  than liberally
The  sensitivity of  the effects of  the  proposal to  small changes in  the  quota and  to
unpredictable changes in world and EC market conditions mean that setting the quota to
efficiently  achieve  price, marketing  margin,  and welfare  transfer objectives  would be difficult
in the extreme.
Ultimately, officials well removed from the market would be forced to make judgements
about the level of the quota. Overshooting  in pursuit  of the Commission's  objective  by setting
the quota conservatively  - that is tending to set it on the low side  - would  have several
managerial advantages. The main objective, to protect  the sales revenue  of preferred
producers and marketers,  would at least be achieved;  non-preferred  producers and marketers
would be offered some form of compensation  in the form of higher marketing  margins on the
restricted  volumes  they  would  be  permitted  to  sell  - a  sort of  sweetener  - and;  the
performance  of the scheme in terms of its critical objectives  would become less sensitive  to
fluctuations in the world and EC markets. In addition, higher banana prices would suit
producers of other fruit within the the EC because higher banana prices would  encourage  the
consumption  of other fruit.15
This all points to a quota being set more in line with versions 4a, 4b or 4c than version 1. If
so, it also points to a unified EC banana policy at least as inefficient as the set of national
policies  it is set to replace.  It also points  to a number  of additional  problems.
Other inefficienries  of the proposal
Preferred  producers and marketers want the quota to be restrictive. A 1 percent reduction in
quota could yield the preferred  producers and marketers  an estimated additional  $50 million
in profits. This would hold out the possibility of Inducing increased non-dollar banana
production which, in turn, would require further off-setting  decreases in the quota on dollar
bananas. For example, if preferred sappliers were successful in lobbying for an initial 60
thousand  ton decrease  (or 2.5 percent)  in the quota from that determined  under  version 1, and
all of the extra preferred  supplier  revenue  raised as a result were channelled  back to preferred
producers  in the form of higher producer  prices, non-dollar  banana  production  would  increase
by an estimated 146 thousand  tons. This would require  a similar sized additional  reduction in
the quota on dollar bananas. It would  impose additional  costs on non-preferred  suppliers  and
add to the unpredictability  of the proposal.
Also adding to its unpredictability would be the fact that the market would be highly
uncompetitive. True, over half the EC bananas are currently sold under conditions of
restricted competition anyway, but quotas and licenses would greatly remove the threat of
EC-wide competition. Without the threat of competition it may pay some marketers of
bananas to either collude to further restrict the supply of bananas - destroy them after
importation  - or, in some cases to even do so individually. Because of the nature of EC
banana demand,  a 1 percent decrease in market supplies  raises the EC consumer  price by an
estimated 10 percent. Any marketer with more than a 10 percent share could be made better
off by destroying bananas after they had been imported and recorded against the quota. All
other marketers of bananas  would also benefit by such action  and so the incentives  to collude
in such activity are also very great. Were this to occur it would add to the costs of the policy
in obvious ways.
Protecting  marketers' excess profits seems to be the major result
If the Commission  were to aim to protect only the revenues  of preferred  producers and not of
their marketers  - version  3 figure 3.4 - the proposal  would impose costs on consumers
considerably  less than is the case under  other versions.  Still, costs to EC consumers  would  be
2.3 times higher than the benefits that would be received by preferred producers, but this
would be less than half the costs of existing schemes. Moreover,  40 percent of the cost to
consumers would be due to the 20 percent import duty on bananas. This helps highlight
another apparent objective of the proposal: to raise revenue for the Commission. The 20
percent tariff plays only an incidental  part in protecting  the revenues  of preferred  producers.16
If the primary objective  of the proposal is to guarantee the revenues of preferred  producers
only, there would be no need  to impose  the additional  20 percent import  duty; nor would  it be
necessary  to protect the excess marketing  margins of marketers.  If the proposal were geared
simply to achieve  the primary  objective,  its economic  costs could be reduced to around $400
million or less each year. If preferred marketers' excess margins were not protected, they
would be forced to compete with the most efficient marketers  of bananas.  Either they would
lower their margins  or be forced out of business,  leaving the marketing  of preferred  producers
bananas  to more efficient  operators.
If the stated objective of the proposal  - to protect the revenues of preferred producers-
were truly the primary objective  of the proposal,  fixing the quota in a manner  consistent  with
variant 3 should be the Commission's  aim; it could remove the provision for a 20 percent
import duty. But indeed, were this the case, why operate a quota scheme at all? The same
objective  could be achieved  more simply  and more  efficiently  using a self-financing  tariff.
A self-financing tariff would befar  more efficient
A tariff could be set to raise enough  revenue to operate a direct  deficiency  payment  scheme as
proposed in the two previous studies.  The level of tariff now required to generate sufficient
revenue for such a scheme would be less than that calculated previously because of the
structural changes which have occurred in the EC market since 1987. Where previously a
17.8 percent tariff was estimated, now a 17.3 percent tariff would be sufficient because the
market has grown - giving a greater volume  of imports  over which to spread the fixed costs
of the deficiency  payment  scheme.
The economic  costs of the self-financing  tariff scheme  and deficiency  payment arrangements
relative to costs of selected  versions of the proposal are set out in figure.  3.6. Such a scheme
can be seen to be considerably more efficient than even the most efficient version of the
Commission's proposal. A tariff only option offers other advantages.  It would be simple to
administer, compared to a quota-based  scheme; transfers  of deficiency payments would be
direct, certain and well targeted  compared to indirect,  highly uncertain  and hit-or-miss  under
the Commission's  proposal  which would  use quotas and licenses;  setting  of the tariff could be
done in an objective way and would therefore be less vulnerable to political interference
compared  to the setting  of a quota;  the effects  of the tariff would be simple  to monitor  relative
to the effects of  a quota and licenses; the effects of  a tariff would be predictable by
comparison to a quota and licenses; and importantly, the marketing of bananas in the EC
would  be subject to the full forces of competition  which  should  encourage  open,  expansionary
practices, efficiency, innovation, quality, and consumer-oriented marketing efforts - it
would eliminate protection for inefficient marketers and eliminate hidden incentives for
manipulating  supplies  to exploit  consumers.17
In the earlier studies we have pointed  out that direct aid payments  and a self-financing  tariff
would be even more efficient than a deficiency payment scheme which was financed by
raising revenue through a tariff. In figure 3.6 and 3.7 the estimated up-dated costs and
benefits of such a scheme are compared with those for other schemes. The results show the
direct aid/self-financing  tariff type of scheme to be the most efficient way of achieving  the
Community's  goal of providing  assistance  to preferred  supplier  countries  and regions and that
this can be achieved while nearly eliminating the costs now imposed on non-preferred
suppliers.
Figure 3.6: Self financing tariff options would be much less costly than quotas
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Figure 3.7: Self-financing  tariff options are best for banana supplying regions too
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4. A BETTER  PROPOSAL  WOULD  SEEK  GENUINE
REFORM  AND  GAINS  FROM  UNIFICATION
At best the Commission's  proposal  for a unified EC banan  X  policy and market appears  to be
little more than a way of replacing existing distortionary national policies with an almost
equally distortionary single policy and market. The main difference between the effects of
existing national policies and the proposed scheme is that a large proportion of the costs
would be shifted  from consumers  in the United  Kingdom,  France,  Spain, Portugal  and Italy to
consumers  in Germany,  the Netherlands,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland  and Luxembourg.  Given
the scope for collusion among marketers and the incentives to set the quotas tightly, the
Commission's  proposai could impose costs even higher than existing policies. Quota
restrictions  may be applied in such a way as to reduce banana  imports to levels less than now
and markets which currently gain the benefits of mostly open and competitive marketing
would face closed and uncompetitive  conditions. Closed, less than fully competitive and
inefficient  marketing  would  be extended  Community-wide.
For the developing  countries exporting bananas, the proposal offers little. At best it would
maintain  the aid currently  delivered  to preferred  supplier  countries  and not impose  additional
costs on non-preferred  suppliers. At worst, it would impose higher costs on non-preferred
suppliers and introduce considerable uncertainty and confusion about the level of support
preferred  supplier  countries  would  receive.  Whatever  the quota and licensing  system decided
upon by the Commission  it would  result in indirect transfers  or payments of subsidies which
would  not be able to be well targeted.  Some  existing  preferred  producers  may miss out.
TIhe  opportunity  to reduce the costs imposed on non-preferred  suppliers and to increase the
efficiency  of delivering aid to preferred  suppliers seems to have been overlooked.  Likewise,
the opportunity  to increase  competition  in marketing,  to rationalise  trade, and achieve better
economies  of scale and scope in the distribution  and marketing  of bananas  seem to have been
overlooked.
To meet the stated obligations  of the Community,  to honor commitments  to banana  producers
in preferred  regions and to guarantee  their existing privileges  of access and high prices, much
more simple, administratively convenient and competitive policies could be used. These
involve the use of a self-financing  tariff to raise revenue to operate well-targeted  deficiency
payment  or direct aid schemes  for these producers.  Under  these schemes  the costs of meeting
the Community's maior obligation  could be reduced to less than 25 percent of current costs,
the interests of pre`erred suppliers  could be preserved  or expanded  and the costs imposed  on
non-preferred  suppliers  could be virtually  eliminated. However, under a self-financing  tariff
the excessive marketing margins of currently-protected  marketers of both non-dollar and
dollar fruit would be eliminated. Currently-protected  marketers would be the only losers of
self-financing  tariff options.19
Understandably,  protected  marketers will lobby to try and maintain  their privileges.  The EC
proposal seems to be designed to encourage  that. Under a small self-financing  tariff-based
scheme, the privileges of such marketers could only be maintained  through direct transfers
from the Community  budget. Such transfers would be highly transparent,  controversial and
difficult to sustain.  Under the EC proposal, consumers  would bear the cost and it would be
less visible and open to public scrutiny  - in part because the proposal involves the use of
highly complicated non-transparent instruments. But maintaining excessive marketing
margins  for EC marketers  of bananas  is hardly the objective  of the Single  European  Act 1986.
Indeed,  it is inconsistent  with the spirit of the Act.
Officials who have designed the proposal and who would have to administer its complex
arrangements  are in an awkward  position. On the one hand their tasks would be difficult and
thankless. On the other hand, the difficult and thankless tasks would provide them with
tremendous  power and control  over the market.
The proposal is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of GATT. The allocation of
quotas and licenses would be discriminatory, and restrictive non-tariff barriers would be
established. Barriers would be raised against non-preferred  suppliers in order to provide a
trade advantage to preferred suppliers. The proposal also contravenes the principles of the
current Uruguay Round reforms. As such it represents a further hurdle in the negotiation
process.
The EC countries currently without quota arrangements and which enjoy the benefits of
mostly open markets - particularly Germany - will be major losers of the proposal should
it go ahead. They have a vested interest in maintaining  relatively open markets.  They should
therefore have a stronger political will to act than the quota-protected  countries. However,
even in the quota-protected  countries, consumers and the Community at large stand to be
made better off through  implementing  genuine  reform  rather than that proposed.
The opportunity  exists to target aid to ensure a higher pay-off from it than now. Under the
Commission's  proposal the  mechanism for delivering support to preferred  supplying
countries and regions would become less direct and certain than now. The mechanism
proposed  relies on one group of marketers  collecting  excess marketing  margins on the sale of
dollar banana, handing that to marketers of non-dollar bananas, who in turn hand it to
preferred producers. Thlere  are many grey areas relating to which groups will have what
amount of market power and how they will use it in the distribution of the excessive
marketing  margins  created.  There is a very real danger,  therefore,  that were the proposal  to go
ahead,  increasingly  restrictive  regulations  and controls  would be introduced  to try combat the
types of problems  which would arise in a closed and relatively uncompetitive  market such as
that proposed. The costs of the proposal could turn out to be much greater than those
estimated  here.20
Bananas is the last remaining product on which the European Community must make a
decision  about how to unify its market.  Acceptance  of the Commission's  proposal  would be a
major victory for the protected banana marketers of the European Community  and a major
loss for the Community itself, its consumers, and dollar and non-dollar banana producers.
This is hardly the intended  objective  of EC market unification.21
APPENDIX  A: NOTES  ON DATA
In this study 1990 prices and 1993 forecast trade volumes are used. Prices are mainly taken
from FAO documents  and trade tapes. The US import  cif price is derived by multiplying  the
US import fob price by a factor of 1.12. The German import cif price is taken from the UN
trade system. The Canary Islands export fob price is derived by subtracting  transportation
costs from the cif price (from EC Commission  report).  The retail price in Spain is estimated
by adding average retail margins in France and UK to the cif price. US prices are used as
world indicative prices whereas German prices are used as free market prices in the EC.
There are some differences  in retail margins  between  US and Germany.  This is mainly  due to
non-tradable characteristics of retail services. The retail price in ot.'er  EC countries is
estimated by adding a 20 percent tariff plus retail margins to the German cif import prnce.
Imports  and exports for 1993  are World Bank  forecasts.
Baselina data
Prices  $US/ton
US for (free on rail)  566
US retail  948
German retail  1520
UK retail  2036
France retail  2086
Spain retail  2587
Other EC retail  2315
Latin America fob  1643
Jamaica & Windward Islands  fob  245
Guadeloupe & Martinique fob  548
Cameroon & Cote d'Ivoire fob  506
Somalia fob  354
Canary Islands fob  696
Other ACP fob  333




Spain & Portugal  496
Germany  1293
Other EC  415
Rest of World  6143
Exports  '000  tons
Guadeloupe & Martinique  339
Jamaica & Windward Islands  359
Cameroon & Cote d'Ivoire  186
Somalia  78
Canary Islands & Madeira  438
Other ACP  97
Rest of World  826722
REFERENCES
Borrell, B. and Yang, M. 1990, EC  Bananarama 1992, WPS 523,  International Economics
Department,  World  Bank Washington,  DC.
Borrell, B. and Cuthbertson,  S. 1992, EC Banana Policy 1992: Picking the Best Option, Centre for
Intemational  Economics,  Canberra.
EC Commission 1992, Setting-up the Internal  Market in the Banana Sector, Report complied by a
Commission ad hoc  'Bananas'  interdepartmental working party working to  Commission
guidelines,  Commission  working  document,  SEC(92)  940 final, Brussels.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of  the United Nations)  1991, Banana  Statistics,
CCP:BA  91/6, Rome.
FAO 1991,  Banana ISformation  Note, Rome.
FAO 1991,  Medium-Term  Outlookfor World  Trade  in Bananas,  CCP:BA  91/3, Rome.
World  Bank 1989,  World  Development  Report  1989, Oxford  University  Press, New York.
World  Bank 1991,  World  Development  Report  1991, Oxford  University  Press, New York.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS934  Public  Hospital  Costs  and Quality  Maureen  A. Lewis  July 1992  P. Trapanl
in the Dominican  Republic  Margaret  B. Sulvetta  31947
Gerard  M. LaForgia
WPS935  The  Precautionary  Demand  for  BoumrJong  Choe  July 1992  S. Lipscomb
Commodity  Stocks  33718
WPS936  Taxation, Information  Asymmetries,  Andrew  Lyon  July 1992  C. Jones
and  a Firm's  Financing  Choices  37699
WPS937  How Soft Is  the Budget  Constraint  Evan Kraft  July 1992  CECSE
for Yugoslav  Firms?  Milan  Vodopivec  37178
WPS938  Health,  Government,  and the Poor:  Nancy  Birdsali  July 1992  S. Rothschild
The Case  for the Private  Sector  Estelle  James  37460
WPS939  How Macroeconomic  Policies  Affect  Daniel  Kaufmann  July 1992  D. Kaufmann
Project  Performance  in the Social  Yan  Wang  37305
Sectors
WPS940  Private  Sector  Approaches  to  Karen  G. Foreit  August  1992  0. Nadora
Effective  Family  Planning  31091
WPS941  Projecting  the Demographic  Impact  RodoHo  A. Bulatao  August  1992  0. Nadora
of AIDS  Eduard  Bos  31091
WPS942  Efficient  Environmental  Regulation:  Arik Levinson  August 1992  WDR
Case  Studies  of Urban  Air  Pollution  Sudhir Shetty  31393
(Los  Angeles,  MexioD  City, Cubatao,
and  Ankara)
WPS943  Burden-sharing  among  Official  and  Asli Demirg8cg-Kunt  August  1992  K. Waelti
Private Creditors  Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias  37664
WPS944  How Public  Sector  Pay  and  Gail Stevenson  August  1992  PHREE
Employment  Affect Labor  Markets:  33680
Research  Issues
WPS945  Managing  the Civil Service:  What  Barbara  Nunberg  August 1992  P. Infante
LDCs  Can Learn  from Developed  37642
Country  Reforms
WPS946  Retraining  Displaced  Workers:  What  Duane  E. Leigh  August  1992  PHREE
Can Developing  Countries  Learn  from  33680
OECD  Nations?
WPS947  Strategies  for Creating  Transitional  Stephen  L. Mangum  August 1992  PHREE
Jobs during Structural  Adjustment  Garth  L Mangum  33680
Janine  BowenPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS948  Factors  Affecting  Private  Financial  Mohua  Mukherjee  July 1992  R. Lynn
Flows to Eastern  Europe,  1989-91  32169
WPS949  The Impact  of Formal  Finance  on the  Hans  Binswanger  August  1992  H. Binswanger
Rural Economy  of India  Shahidur  Khandker  31871
WPS950  Service:  The  New Focus  in  Hans  JOrgen  Peters  August 1992  A. Elcock
International  Manufacturing  and  Trade  33743
WPS951  Piecemeal  Trade  Reform  in Partially  Glenn  W. Harrison  August 1992  D. Ballantyne
Liberalized  Economies:  Thomas  F. Rutherford  38004
An Evaluation  for Turkey  David  G. Tarr
WPS952  Unit Costs, Cost-Effectiveness,  and  Susan  Horton  August  1992  0. Nadora
Financing  of Nutrition  Interventions  31091
WPS953  The  "Pedigreer  of IEC  Conversion  Michael  Hee  August  1992  E.  Zamora
Factors  for Per Capita  GNP  Computations  33706
for the World Bank's  Operational
Guidelines  and Atas
WPS954  How OECD  Policies  Affected  Latin  Chris  Allen  August 1992  T. G. Srinivasan
America  In  the 1980s  David  Currie  31288
T. G. Srnivasan
David  Vines
WPS955  OECD  Fiscal  Policies  and  the  George  Alogoskoufis  August 1992  D. Gustafson
Relative  Prices  of Primary  Panos  Varangis  33714
Commodities
WPS956  Regression  Estimates  of Per  Capita  Sultan  Ahmad  August  1992  E. OReilly-Campbell
GDP Based  on Purchasing  Power  Parities  33707
WPS957  Carbon  Taxes,  the Greenhouse  Anwar  Shah  August 1992  WDR  Office
Effect,  and Developing  Countries  Blom Larsen  31393
WPS958  EC Bananarama  1992:  The  Sequel  Brent  Borrell  August 1992  A. Kitson-Waiters
-The  EC  Commission  Proposal  Maw-Cheng  Yang  33712